The nuclear abolition movement in Japan got into full swing 10 years after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in the wake of the Daigo Fukuryu Maru Incident in 1954. One can cite press restrictions during the U.S. occupation as one reason, but that makes one wonder why a peace movement did not gain momentum in 1952 after Japan regained its independence through the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Looking back at the controversy over the inscription on the cenotaph for A-bomb victims, which flared up immediately after the unveiling of the cenotaph in 1952, we can see that most *hibakusha* were eager to pursue U.S. culpability for the atomic bombings. Even so, considering the impact of occupation policy and public feeling toward the Emperor at that time, it would have been difficult for Hiroshima to even consider initiating a peace movement in those days. But such a movement should have started somewhere in Japan. Why was there no such movement in Japan?

The *Japan Confederation of A- and H-bomb Sufferers Organizations* (Nihon Hidankyo) was established in 1956 at the second World Conference against Nuclear Weapons. According to Heiichi Fujii, the first Secretary General of the Confederation, nuclear abolition and A-bomb survivor relief were placed as a pair of wheels for the peace movement in the first declaration of the World Conference. In their initial stages, relief activities for *hibakusha* succeeded in establishing the A-bomb Survivors Medical Care Law, but people engaged in these activities sometimes found themselves in an awkward position, ridiculed as “welfare cases” even by their relatives. Ironically, Nihon Hidankyo started its own peace movement activities after the World Conference against Nuclear Weapons split up. Nihon Hidankyo has remained unified, though Hiroshima Hidankyo remains divided.

The great milestone in the *hibakusha* issue was the NGO International Symposium on Damages and After-effects of the Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, held in 1977, where all problems regarding *hibakusha* were discussed. Even today, the symposium’s report, titled “The Realities of Atomic Bombings and the Actual Situation of A-bomb Victims,” is the first text to read when thinking about *hibakusha* problems. Even on the 50th or 60th anniversaries of the atomic bombings, we find nothing superior to that report, which makes us wonder why so little has changed since 1977.

The Health and Welfare Ministry conducted its first survey on *hibakusha* long after 20 years in 1965. It released the results two years later, but did not indicate that anything should be done for them. The Council for Basic Problems of A-bomb Victims, a private consultative body to the Health and Welfare Ministry, released a report on December 11, 1980, which cast a long shadow on *hibakusha* policies. The report said that Japanese people should equally accept and tolerate the damage caused by the War, and that the government had to strike a balance between assistance for *hibakusha* and for other victims of the War.

In response, *hibakusha* in Hiroshima sent a letter of protest to the Health and Welfare Ministry. Medical social workers, who helped them draft the letter, set up the “Association of Counselors for A-bomb Victims” in June 1981. This group holds general meetings every August 6th, when *hibakusha* give their testimonies. They also hold a symposium and lecture meeting every December 11th. Looking back on the history of the group, we regret that we were never able to develop a working theory or peace movement surpassing the 1977 symposium report, and that we failed to convey the comprehensive picture and realities about *hibakusha* from a new and more advanced perspective. Though individual *hibakusha* had strong feelings, it was difficult to develop their feelings into a campaign or protest. We feel deep remorse for not being able to channel their feelings toward a drive to say “when something is wrong, we have to say so.” This failure meant that grass-roots movements never developed.

As a background factor curbing the drive of the *hibakusha*, we can point out that Hiroshima has been led by the national government and has shown no strong inclination to “protest against authority.” In Hiroshima people rarely make requests of the government. They would never take action against the government’s wishes. Shortly after I moved to Hiroshima, someone told me, “It’s true that Hiroshima is an A-bombed city, but people in Hiroshima are not necessarily against the re-arming of Japan.”

Some people visiting Hiroshima say that people here should stop using the phrase “the only country to have suffered nuclear attacks” or “an A-bombed city.” What they say can be interpreted as the question: “Hasn’t the phrase ‘A-bombed city’ lost substance by this time?” Or it might be the message, “If you really want to use the expression ‘A-bombed city,’ you should use it decently and sincerely.” It seems that people in Hiroshima do not notice the way people outside of Hiroshima look at them. I think that Hiroshima is very tired. Because of that, no new hero has come along to unleash his energy, as Heiichi Fujii used to do. New ideas are not born. Even at the 60th anniversary of the atomic bombing, Hiroshima failed to come up with anything new.

Lastly, in accordance with the will of Heiichi Fujii, I would like to urge Hidankyo to mobilize nuclear victims and create a worldwide Hidankyo. Hidankyo has the know-how to deal with the political world and governments on international nuclear problems, including the Chernobyl problem. I would recommend that Hidankyo mobilize a second generation of *hibakusha* and supporters with the goal of creating an international Hidankyo. Hidankyo heading such a movement would be deserving of the Nobel Peace Prize.

Asai is president of HPI
North Korea’s failure to feed its own people has driven a starving population across a dangerous 850-mile Sino-DPRK border in search of food. The exact number of North Korean refugees in China is open to debate, ranging from the Chinese government’s conservative estimate of 10,000 to Seoul’s calculation of between 10,000 and 30,000. Humanitarian organizations put the figure as high as 300,000. The refugees’ usual hideouts are the Sino-DPRK border regions densely populated by ethnic-Chinese Koreans, such as the Liaoning and Jilin provinces, Dandong, Tumen and Yanji. The police crackdowns in Beijing late 2004 suggest that a substantial number of refugees are in hiding in the capital area as well.

The continuing influx of North Korean refugees is pushing Beijing to address the current situation in a more straightforward manner – but this will not be an easy matter. Beijing naturally wants to maintain its increasing economic ties with Seoul, now its third largest trading partner. And while Beijing wants to prove its respect for human rights to the international community, it does not wish to damage its alliance with Pyongyang, with whom it shares a mutual security pact.

Moreover, China has enough social woes of its own. It does not need additional, externally-imposed burdens. The list of China’s domestic problems ranges from a rapidly deteriorating environment, a growing number of internal migrants and “floating unemployed,” a worsening labor-management situation, an increasing imbalance in the boy-girl birth ratio, and rampant corruption. Under the circumstances, Beijing cannot welcome another source of strain by having to deal with a massive influx of famished people from a neighboring country. Beijing is therefore faced with several dilemmas at once.

Defining North Koreans in China:
“Refugees” or “Illegal Economic Migrants”?

Currently, Beijing designates North Korean refugees as “illegal economic migrants.” The United Nations, along with the majority of legal experts, regard them as refugees, who should be granted refugee status on the grounds of refoulement, as returnees to North Korea are known to suffer from severe repercussions, including capital punishment. Labeling North Korean escapees as “illegal economic migrants” goes beyond a simple difference in preferred choices of words. It is the conscious byproduct of Beijing’s carefully calculated effort to evade any legal or political responsibilities for these people.

By designating the escapees to be “illegal economic migrants,” Beijing exempts itself from any moral and ethical obligations to these persons. Police crackdowns, cash rewards for turning in escapees, and levying hefty fines on citizens who aid them are therefore legitimate and justifiable.

Beijing’s definition has been particularly tragic for North Korean women who comprise two-thirds of all escapees.

North Korean women hiding in China are often forced into violent marriages or sold into sexual slavery, but since they are “illegal economic migrants,” they are stripped of any legal recourse.

The People’s Republic’s rising economic and military power entails higher expectations of its moral leadership in the region, and yet, its history is riddled with bloody sanctions against anti-regime challenges. The memories of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre have not faded, nor has Beijing’s decades-old brutal crackdown in Tibet.

Complicating this issue, Beijing has been voicing concerns over the unilateral imposition of universal human rights on non-Western contexts. Advocacy for individual rights has been deemed a Western invention with limited validity in more group-oriented Confucian cultural contexts like that of China. Beijing, for instance, has never supported the Bush administration’s elevation of human rights as a core political agenda.

Appeasing Pyongyang and Preventing Regime Collapse

China obviously wishes the North Korean refugee problem would simply go away, but it has grown too big to ignore. In trying to deal with this issue, however, Beijing is trapped between encouraging Pyongyang to reform its economic practices, in order to ease the influx, and at the same time working to prevent regime collapse. Beijing is trying to appease and prod North Korea toward reform by aligning with it. Assigning “refugee” status to the North Korean escapees would be an admission that Kim Jong-il’s leadership is politically repressive and is, therefore, a nonstarter.

Meanwhile, to prevent further mass exodus from North Korea into its territory, Beijing needs to make sure that the current regime does not collapse abruptly, causing chaos in the region. That would be a major disaster for China’s booming economy. During the latter half of 2004, the Chinese military deployed its elite troops along the Sino-DPRK frontier to tighten it. Beijing’s provision of oil and food is designed to sustain the failing regime. China is the third largest benefactor of humanitarian aid to Pyongyang, behind Seoul and Washington.

Beijing knows that it can play an important role as mediator between Pyongyang and other regional powers. But to maintain the upper hand in the coalition, China cannot afford to lose its alliance with North Korea. As much as Pyongyang needs Beijing, its sole ally, Beijing needs to stay in close touch with Pyongyang to remain mediator and leader of the six-party framework. Sadly, in this complicated equation of security and human rights, the plight of North Korean refugees and the debate as to their human rights continues to fall between the cracks.

Kim is assistant professor at HPI
Facing the Future in Iraq by Facing the Past

By Robert Jacobs

In the current debate raging in the United States about the consequences of withdrawing American troops from Iraq, one thing sorely missing in the discussion is honesty about the past, honesty about how we have arrived at this present dilemma.

In the series of old speeches and policy statements pieced together (in response to growing political pressure at home) to form President Bush’s “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq,” the President lays out the “consequences of failure.” These consequences repeat Bush administration rhetoric intended to rebuke those who call for a withdrawal of U.S. forces. The bullet points detailed include:

- Iraq becoming a haven for terrorists.
- Iraq becoming a country tormented by “inhumane practices.”
- Iraq becoming a “failed state and source of instability for the entire Middle East.”
- Failure will place the American people in greater danger by destabilizing a vital region.
- Failure will call into question “American credibility.”
- Failure will weaken “the growing democratic impulses in the region. Middle East reformers would never again fully trust American assurances of support for democracy and pluralism in the region.”


This is the picture that the Bush administration paints of the consequences of American withdrawal or failure in its war in Iraq. The problem with this picture is that it places these consequences in the future when in fact they are a part of the present situation in Iraq and in the Middle East. These consequences were a direct result, not of a United States withdrawal from Iraq, but of the United States entry into Iraq.

The United States military entered Iraq and easily defeated Saddam Hussein’s army in the spring and summer of 2003. Only after this time Iraq became a haven for terrorists, and only after this time the avowed enemy of the United States, al-Qaeda, established a presence in Iraq and began to carry out terrorist actions against the Iraqi people, U.S. armed forces and military contractors. Naïve beliefs about the Iraqi people welcoming the U.S. military as liberators, and a general lack of planning for the post-Saddam era in Iraq resulted in a “failed state,” or more accurately, statelessness. This situation has created an intensely destabilized Middle East, with terrorist attacks spreading to many countries, and rising tensions between Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims region-wide. The growing instability in the Middle East has fueled anti-American sentiments worldwide and placed the American people in far greater danger than the trumped up weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) ever did.

The widespread use of torture by U.S. forces against the Iraqi people has made “inhumane practices” endemic in Iraq (and in American “black site” prisons). Far from liberating the Iraqi people from such horrific threats, the entrance of the U.S. into Iraq has merely changed the nationality (and the religion) of the perpetrators, while maintaining the scale and cruelty of the torture of Iraqi political prisoners.

Similarly, the initial political structures pursued by the Bush administration in Iraq were far from democratic. These policies focused on creating provincial and municipal councils whose members were to be picked by Paul Bremer, the head of the U.S.-installed Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). It was only at the insistence of Grand Ayatollah Sistani that such a plan was abandoned. The right for one person/one vote was forced on the U.S. by Sistani, who easily recognized that Shiites have a statistical majority, and, therefore, could rule in a democratic Iraq. Further, CPA moves to consolidate power over Iraqi ministries and oil production have offset American rhetoric paying lip service to democracy. The message heard loud and clear throughout the Middle East is that of the imposition of power rather than the implementation of democracy.

What then of American credibility? The question must be asked, is there any American credibility left in the Middle East, or the rest of the world? When the United States has abandoned the Geneva Convention, has violated the sovereignty of numerous states through kidnappings, has planted stories in the press of Iraq as well as in its own country, what credibility is left? When it launched a “preventive war” based on falsified intelligence and alarmist rhetoric, its credibility became the first casualty of its own actions.

There will be no clear way forward for the United States in Iraq until it faces this past. The Bush administration must be honest with itself and with the people of the world, brutally honest, if it has any hope of changing the current situation in Iraq, any hope of offering the Iraqi people some semblance of stability and prosperity. To carry the present circumstances into a rhetorical future is to continue to take the U.S. and countless millions around the world further down a hole of failure and bloodshed.

Jacobs is assistant professor at HPI
International law seems to be violated quite frequently. Superpowers often take actions inconsistent with international law, yet sanctions are rarely imposed on them. When small states commit illegal acts, however, law enforcement actions are quickly taken by major powers. No wonder it is commonly said that international law is like a spider’s web, which traps mosquitoes, but is broken by a wasp. This characteristic of international law gives some the impression that it should not be considered “law,” at least not in the same sense as domestic law. Some go so far as to dismiss the entire system of international law as just a false veneer over raw power politics. On the other hand, international law would be of no use if violations routinely went unchallenged. If we think of violations of international law as actual violations of law, we might hope that arguments based on the principle “Ex injuria non oritur jus” (“illegal acts do not create a legal norm”), emphasizing the logical coherence of international law, will make public opinion toward acceptance of international rule of law, ultimately limiting power politics to a certain extent.

The problems are not that simple, however, because no supranational legislature has plenary powers comparable to a nation’s parliament. The United Nations General Assembly does have the power to pass resolutions, but except on budgetary matters, its resolutions are merely recommendations and are not legally binding. Similarly, when a diplomatic conference is held to conclude a treaty, each nation is basically free to decide whether or not to participate. Even when a situation clearly requires that international law be changed, the international community has no institutional measure by which to compel nations to accept the change. Given this structure, or lack of structure, major powers often choose to take unilateral actions that cannot be justified under existing law, virtually forcing other nations to recognize the legitimacy and effectiveness of such actions. Sometimes major powers even seem to think that this is, in fact, the way to develop new rules of international law; they tend to argue, in effect, that illegal acts do create legal norms, or to be more precise, that “seemingly illegal acts can establish a new legal order.”

The formation of such concepts as “crime against humanity” and “crime against peace,” originating in the trials of the war criminals before the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, may be seen as an example of new legal norms created through “illegal acts.” Traditionally, these military trials were condemned as invalid on two grounds. They were criticized in the first place for applying *ex post facto* laws, which the defendants could not have referred to when they committed the criminal acts in question. Strong criticism has also been leveled on the grounds that these tribunals did not honor the principle that trials should be conducted in a court composed of detached and neutral magistrates. It is certainly difficult to say that the punishments imposed by the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals were authorized by then-existing international law, since there were no established rules regarding war crimes, such as those enumerating prohibited acts and providing penalties for violations. Having said this, it is entirely possible that the law applied in those tribunals actually created an international consensus against war and toward respect for human rights, leading to the development of international humanitarian law.

We may well say that apparent violations of traditional legal rules by the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals were committed to create new rules of international law necessary for the contemporary international community.

Some people maintain that the United States abandoned any attempt to justify its actions under international law, throwing away the fig leaf that had covered its embarrassing motivations, when it started the Iraq War in 2003. Admittedly, the legal justification for the war given by the United States was far from persuasive, but it is hardly self-evident that it should be dismissed as totally implausible from the start. Suppose that the United States did have convincing evidence that Iraq possessed WMDs. Then it is not impossible to argue that United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441, stipulating that Iraq would face “serious consequences” as a result of its continued violations, authorized the use of force against Iraq. Likewise, suppose that the United States had convincing evidence of imminent attacks by terrorists armed with WMDs supplied by Iraq. In such a case, it is possible to justify the Iraq War as an exercise of the “right to preemptive self-defense.”

In retrospect, as President Bush admitted on December 14, 2005, so-called evidence of WMDs in Iraq was generally flimsy and some was fabricated. If the United States government knew that factual preconditions for the use of force against Iraq were nonexistent when it started the war, then we must say that the Iraq War was illegal, regardless of whether or not we accept the justification submitted by the United States. Generally, however, a policy decision is presumed to be reasonable as long as it is supported by sufficient information to meet legal requirements; it need not be based on scientific findings. Considering that mistaken self-defense is not in and of itself illegal, the Iraq War may still be justified as long as the information leading to the war was credible enough to meet legal requirements, even though such information later turned out to be unsubstantiated.

Assuming that the justification of the Iraq War offered by the United States fails under existing international law, the crucial question should be whether we are ready, in light of the long-term effect on the international legal process, to endorse or acquiesce in the creation of new legal norms through “illegal acts.” International law, in principle, does not allow the use of violent countermeasures against “structural violence,” and regards the deterrence of terrorism as a legitimate goal. Accordingly, it comes into question whether the “right to preemptive self-defense,” which may currently be “illegal,” should be recognized as a means of deterring terrorism, or whether such action should be deemed to be an abuse of the right of self-defense. The key point for international law in the post-Iraq War era is to dissociate the question of what the law should be from our assessment of the Iraq War itself: We have to be careful not to prohibit all preventive anti-terrorism measures by banning every use of force, but at the same time, we should probably avoid completely lifting the ban on the use of force when terrorism worries are cited as the excuse.

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To date, the Hiroshima Peace Institute (HPI) has held international symposiums, research forums, public lecture meetings and other events designed to share outcomes of HPI research projects and to exchange views and information with other researchers and citizens. Since fiscal year 2002, the HPI has annually held a lecture series for citizens, each series comprising about 10 lectures.

In contrast to the research forums, where external researchers lecture primarily for specialists, the lecture series for citizens is designed to share research outcomes with the general public. At the lectures, HPI researchers and other lecturers explain their specialties and activities as plainly as possible. The purpose of sharing research outcomes with the general public is to provide them with relevant information to help them think about peace more deeply and include it in their actions. For further information on the program, please refer to the related article, published in the March 2003 issue of this journal.

In previous years, HPI held the lecture series for citizens from autumn to early winter (all three previous lecture series began in November), to the related article, published in the March 2003 issue of this journal. It in their actions. For further information on the program, please refer to the related article, published in the March 2003 issue of this journal.

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First lecture series in 2002
“Memories and the Future of Northeast Asia: Towards a Mutual Understanding of Asian Peoples in the 21st Century”
Second lecture series in 2003
“Wars Encountered by Civilians: A Perspective Towards the Establishment of Peace in the 21st Century”
Third lecture series in 2004
“War and Peace: Seen through Culture, Ideas and Movements”

While the previous lecture series took a multi-faceted approach to a broad range of themes relating to war and peace, this fourth lecture series (in fiscal year 2005) was designed to analyze several problems relating to nuclear weaponry and the atomic bombings in 1945. By focusing on these issues, the organizers sought to clarify the nature of these problems.

Because 60 years have passed since the first atomic bombing in Hiroshima, we considered it essential to review the experiences of A-bomb survivors and to explore ideal methods of passing on to future generations the knowledge and lessons acquired from their experiences. In the hope that this lecture series will provide the public with a good opportunity to consider new strategies for movements to abolish nuclear weaponry, we decided that the theme of the fourth event would be “Experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Atomic Bombing and Current Challenges from Nuclear Weaponry.”

In planning the fourth lecture series, we studied the Hiroshima - Nagasaki Peace Study Courses, which were planned by Hiroshima City, to prepare programs in connection with the study courses. In fiscal year 2002 HPI began providing model courses of the Hiroshima - Nagasaki Peace Study Courses at Hiroshima City University. In these courses Mr. Kazumi Mizumoto, HPI associate professor, and other members lectured students on the theme “Peace and Human Rights (Hiroshima and world peace).” On the basis of these experiences we prepared the fourth lecture series, targeting the general public. For lecturers, in addition to scholars and researchers, we invited an A-bomb survivor and a film director. The themes and individual lecturers were as follows:

First lecture (September 26):
“How Should We Approach the Problem of Nuclear Arms? Can We Abolish Nuclear Arms Simply through the Efforts of Anti-nuclear Movements?”
Lecturer: Yuki Tanaka, professor of HPI

Second lecture (October 3):
“How to Convey the Atomic Bombing Experience”
Lecturer: Koji Hosokawa, volunteer guide of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum and member of the Hiroshima World Peace Mission

Third lecture (October 17):
“Late Effects of A-bomb Radiation on the Human Body”
Lecturer: Tetsuo Kimura, director of Hiroshima A-Bomb Survivors Relief Foundation

Fourth lecture (October 24):
“Legal Problem of the Use of Nuclear Weapons under International Law”
Lecturer: Yoshio Matsui, professor of International Law, Ritsumeikan University Graduate School of Law

Fifth lecture (October 31):
“Concealed Hibakusha: Civil Defense Program of U.S. in 1950s and Civil Protection Program of Present Day Japan”
Lecturer: Hiroko Takahashi, research associate at HPI

Sixth lecture (November 14):
“Sears Left by the War on Chinese People: Their Views of Hiroshima”
Lecturer: Tomoko Kana, documentary film director

Seventh lecture (November 21):
“Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and Today’s Challenge of Weapons of Mass Destruction”
Lecturer: Kazumi Mizumoto, associate professor at HPI

Eighth lecture (November 28):
“Distant from Ground Zero: A Study on the Criminality of the Atomic Bombing”
Lecturer: Hitoshi Nagai, assistant professor at HPI

Ninth lecture (December 5):
“North Korean Nuclear Problems: Present Situations and Possible Approaches to a Solution”
Lecturer: Sung Chul Kim, associate professor at HPI

Tenth lecture (December 12):
“Domestic and International Political Environment: Hiroshima’s Position”
Lecturer: Motofumi Arai, president of HPI

The above themes were selected with the aim of scientifically analyzing experiences of atomic bomb victims and survivors – along with current challenges posed by nuclear weaponry – from various perspectives, including, but not limited to, history, politics, international law, medical science, art and peace movements; and to find an ideal way of communicating A-bomb survivor experiences so as to promote movements working toward permanent peace. In planning the lecture programs, we took three approaches to the theme, as described below.

First, to clarify the actual impact inflicted by the A-bomb, we planned a lecture by an A-bomb survivor. At the same time, we planned a lecture focusing on the impact of radiation on human health, including mental health, together with a lecture on legal problems involved in the A-bombing. Second, we sought multi-angled views concerning the A-bombing, and World War II in general. In other words, we sought to introduce views and memories not only of A-bomb victims, but also other people in Japan and abroad. Third, we sought to discuss the experiences of Hiroshima with citizens of other parts of the world, and in raising Hiroshima’s voice for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Third, we sought to analyze the present situation of nuclear weaponry, along with historical trends in nuclear proliferation and nuclear disarmament, so as to develop prospects for the future and explore the role expected of Hiroshima.

As in previous years, we held the fourth lecture series at the multimedia studio of Hiroshima City Plaza for Town Development through Citizen Exchange (sixth floor of the north building). A total of 10 lectures were held, from 6:30 p.m. to 8:30 p.m. on Mondays, from late September to mid-December. Each 2-hour lecture comprised a 90-minute presentation and a 30-minute QA & session. Though we were concerned that a total of 10 evening lectures might be a burden for some citizens, fortunately we received over 90 applications for the lecture series, that has a capacity for only 60 people.

This fact attests to the interest of Hiroshima citizens in the A-bombing and current nuclear threats. Male and female participant numbers were about the same. The average participant age was relatively high since, regrettably, few young people – particularly those in their twenties or under – attended the program. However, all participants were eager to attend the lectures; many asked questions during the Q&A sessions. Their questions, representing various viewpoints, helped to deepen the discussions and were enlightening for both participants and lecturers.

In fiscal year 2006, in consideration of requests from previous participants, we plan to hold the lecture series in spring and autumn on a trial basis. We hope to explore options that can fully meet the high expectations of Hiroshima’s citizens.

By Hitoshi Nagai, assistant professor at HPI

Visit HPI’s web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm
Title: The History of War and Peace in Europe

Speaker: Dr. Sigrid Pöllinger (Secretary General of the Center for Peace Research at Vienna University)

Based on her own rich experience as a member of the Austrian Delegation to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) since 1986, Dr. Sigrid Pöllinger, Secretary General of the Center for Peace Research at Vienna University, recently gave a constructive talk on how the possibility of creating a united and peaceful Europe is starting to become a reality. She explained the current encouraging situation of establishing peace in Europe by analyzing the long history of wars from ancient times till today.

Dr. Pöllinger examined the destruction of the Berlin Wall, the resulting dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the consequent fall of communism that brought the Cold War to an end. She sees events such as these as useful in explaining Europe’s struggles to establish peace. With the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union, a former superpower, was politically split apart and suffered from an economical downfall. Thus the collapse of communism brought victory to the West without necessitating a hot war. Yet, contrary to the general expectation, peace in Europe was far from secure. It soon became clear to the West that the collapse of the Soviet Union imperium actually created various unpredictable and dangerous problems. Ethnic and nationalist tensions broke out in some former totalitarian states, the situation in former Yugoslavia being the extreme example. Hence, as Pöllinger pointed out, it became apparent that democracy alone was not a sufficient solution to the problem of security and to other important political questions.

In Pöllinger’s view, one of the most important preconditions for European security is therefore the strengthening of political and economical reforms in Eastern Europe together with the construction of new European peace and security order. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) could play a major role in achieving these aims. During the Cold War period, the CSCE was the only multinational East-West forum, which included not only all Western European nations but also all the Eastern European states as its members. It was the only institution that regarded Europe as the vast region geographically extending from Vancouver to Vladivostok and dealt with peace and security in a positive sense, with human rights, economy, culture and education as essential points of focus. Ironically the original idea of the CSCE started in the East as a way to clearly divide the East from the West. The Final Act of the CSCE was signed on 1st August 1975. The Soviet Union’s aim had been to make the West formally acknowledge the territory and hegemony of the East. This was the very reason why the East agreed to the Final Act of Helsinki which comprised the 10 principles, including those of territorial integrity and non-interference into internal affairs as well as that of permanently fixed boundaries. However the protection of human rights was also included in the Final Act, which eventually gave strength to the dissidents in the East and contributed to the fall of communism. Therefore, according to Pöllinger, the Helsinki Final Act is a document that provided the foundation for a more united, and secure Europe and can therefore be called the bedrock of the security architecture of post WWII Europe. The OSCE today, which was formed in 1995 based on CSCE, embodies two vital elements – “peace and order in Europe” and “the triumph of human rights.” As a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations the OSCE is today above all a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crises management and rehabilitation in Europe through a comprehensive security system.

In the last few decades, Western Europe has developed a concept of security architecture based on a framework of mutually reinforcing institutions, encompassing the OSCE, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU) and the Council of Europe. Pöllinger stresses that developing cooperative security structures in a new Europe – including Eastern Europe – will require the strengthening and cooperation of these existing organizations. This strengthening will, in turn, require a re-examination of their roles leading to the best possible system of cooperation between these organizations, including the United Nations.

By Yuki Tanaka, professor at HPI

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Title: The Politics of International Solidarity

Speaker: Dr. Jean-Marc Coicaud (Director of the United Nations University New York Office)

Jean-Marc Coicaud’s presentation at the HPI forum in December 2005 was benefiting from theoretical and practical insights of over 10 years of working for the United Nations. Dr. Coicaud was previously a French speechwriter of Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and is currently the Director of the United Nations University New York Office. On the occasion of his forthcoming book “International Solidarity and Responsibility in the 1990s” (Tokyo, Fujikawashoten, forthcoming in the spring 2006), as originally planned, the author spoke about the U.N. Peace Missions in the post-Cold World war and the new period of international relations since 2001, which marks a radical departure.

To measure international solidarity Coicaud looks at U.N. Peace Missions, both classic peacekeeping operations (PKOs) under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter, requiring the agreement of involved parties, and peace enforcement operations under Chapter VII, the latter allows use of force. In the post-Cold War period this latter type of intervention became more prominent within some 30 PKOs. Their number rapidly increased and decreased in the 1990s – after a series of spectacular failures in Somalia, Rwanda and elsewhere – and increased again in the 2000s, this time without U.S. troop involvement.

Peace operations are key to measure solidarity since they ideally do not deal directly with national interests of member states but rather with human rights violations and humanitarian crisis situations. PKOs include new tasks such as preventing and halting conflict as well as post-conflict reconstruction.

Peace missions multiplied but with quite modest results. While some missions are seen as successes, such as the making of a new state in East Timor (after occupation and genocide by Indonesia 1975-99), others such as the missions in Somalia 1993, Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina were failures and have – most seriously in Rwanda 1994 – tarnished the image of the U.N. Only in recent years has the “responsibility to protect” been recognized as a key task of the U.N. This was not least due to the Rwanda disaster where innocent people were slaughtered under the eyes of U.N. troops, with criminal non-action imposed by the Western powers who dominated Security Council decisions since the 1990s.

Though peace operations have sharply increased the spending for it was extremely modest, less than one percent of the military spending by U.S., which remained in the 1990s around $280-300 billion annually and is now over $400 billion/annum. This excludes the huge costs of the Iraq invasion, which heralded a new period of international relations. A period that is marked by a disconnect of security and legitimacy, due to atrocious breaches of international law, illegal warfare and increasing isolation of the U.S. internationally, amid almost global condemnation of the crime of aggression against Iraq.

By Christian Scherrer, professor at HPI
Myanmar Peace Initiative

The second workshop of the project entitled “Myanmar Peace Initiative” was held at the Hiroshima Peace Institute from 26 to 28 October 2005. This second workshop involved the presentation and discussion of six revised papers from the first workshop in March 2005 as well as three newly commissioned papers. One new paper author, Professor Vincent Boudreau from City College of New York, examined state-society and civil-military relations in Southeast Asia, a task previously assigned to Professor Takashi Shiraiishi, who was unable to join the conference for personal reasons. The second new paper examined majority-minority relations in Southeast Asia in general and Myanmar in particular. These papers will serve as the broad introduction to the book of essays on Myanmar that will be the outcome of this project.

The third new paper examined the Kachin minority community and its development in Myanmar. Another paper commissioned at the second workshop will examine the Mon community. Thus, including the earlier papers on the Shan and Karen communities, the book will reflect the views of the four largest minority communities in Myanmar.

Emeritus Professor Robert Taylor from the School of Oriental and African Studies in the University of London and distinguished Professor David Steinberg from Georgetown University were two of the more renowned scholars who presented papers. Special guests at the workshop included Professor Michio Takatani from Hiroshima University and Professor Omar Farouk from Hiroshima City University.

All papers will be revised and resubmitted by the end of December 2005. Emeritus Professor Robert Taylor and I will then edit them before submitting the manuscript for publication. An agreement has been reached for the book to be published in 2006 by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore. The plan is to launch the book in July 2006 when the International Burma Studies Conference will be held in Singapore.

By Narayanan Ganesan, associate professor at HPI

Workshop Report

Political Economy of Interdependence between Two Koreas

The inter-Korean relationship has undergone a significant change since the inauguration of President Kim Dae-jung in 1998. As South Korea has engaged with the North through trade, business investment, and humanitarian aid, North Korea has become reliant on South Korean resources. Actors involved in the expanding relations are not limited to governmental officials but extend to corporations and non-governmental organizations. In this respect, although the relationship is not symmetrical, the two Koreas are becoming coupled and dependent on each other.

Derived from observing this rapid change in inter-Korean relations, the workshop held at Hiroshima Peace Institute on November 10-11, 2005, sought to answer the following question: Will the development of interdependence contribute to peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas? That is, the workshop intended to appraise overall the development of this interdependence and its impact on peace in the Korean Peninsula. In the study of international relations, the question of whether or not interdependence fosters peace is theoretically and empirically contentious.

The workshop participants agreed that various factors affect the security situation in the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, inter-Korean interdependence — particularly economic interdependence — is not the only factor in peaceful existence. Regional dynamics in Northeast Asia, centered on bilateral security alliances and relations between four contending powers, are an important structural factor that constrains or channels inter-Korean relations. And yet, the participants also pointed out that inter-Korean interdependence per se is a dynamic factor that affects regional dynamics or, at the very least, interacts with regional politics, as revealed by changes in the U.S.-South Korea relationship. Workshop participants did avow that the present inter-Korean relationship fails to properly induce North Korea to accommodate international norms and standards that are requirements for the interactive settlement of outstanding issues, including the nuclear development program and the problem of transparency regarding humanitarian aid.

The participants and their presentation titles are as follows:

- “Charity or Partnership: Can NGOs Deepen Interdependence between the Two Koreas?” Edward Reed
- “Interdependence within Confrontation: Implications of the China-Taiwan Case for Korean Peninsula,” Chien-min Chao
- “Two Koreas and Two South Koreas,” Sang-In Jun
- “Impact of Korean Interdependence on North Korean Politics,” In-Young Chun
- “Impact of Korean Interdependence on the North Korean Economy,” Kang-Taeg Lim
- “Danger and Opportunity: Implications of Korean Interdependence for China and Japan,” Timothy Savage
- “U.S.-Korea Relations Engulfed by Two Korea’s Interdependence,” Kenneth Quinones
- “Inter-Korean Transactions in the World Trade Order: Legal Issues,” Pilho Park

By Sung Chull Kim, associate professor at HPI

Visit HPI’s web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm
Robert Jacobs Assistant Professor

Dr. Jacobs joined HPI in October of 2005 after completing his Ph.D. in history at the University of Illinois, U.S. His expertise is in the social and cultural history of nuclear weapons and warfare.

"I feel that working at HPI carries with it a great responsibility to keep in my heart the desires of the people of the world to live free of violence and warfare, and the wishes of the people of Hiroshima to create in our town a beacon of peace and action that can light the way towards peace for all to see."

Yoshiaki Sato Research Associate

Born in 1972. Ph.D. candidate (University of Tokyo). After working as a research associate at the Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo, from April 2003 to September 2005, Mr. Sato has been a research associate at HPI since October 2005. His expertise is in International Law, American law and international law. He is quoted as saying, "I find myself satisfied with working here in Hiroshima. I would like to study jus cosmopoliticum (cosmopolitan law), which is developing steadily in this age of globalization (or counter-globalization). Jus cosmopoliticum, i.e., transnational law or transgovernmental law, should contribute to establishing peace as well as securing human rights around the world in conjunction with traditional international law and constitutional law."