

Forum Mulls Final Report's Contents

- The 2nd Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Conference meets in Hiroshima -

The second meeting of the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, jointly sponsored by the Hiroshima Peace Institute and the Japan Institute of International Affairs, was held in Hiroshima on Dec.18 and 19, 1998.

Eighteen representatives from 16 countries participated in the meeting held to discuss ways to prevent nuclear proliferation and promote global disarmament. The third meeting is scheduled to take place in New York on April 9 and 10. The forum plans to draw up proposals regarding nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament at the end of its fourth and final meeting, which will be held July 23-25 in Tokyo.

At a press conference held after the meeting, then HPI President Yasushi Akashi said, "Although we should not become blindly optimistic, we have gone a long way toward determining our future course." Referring to a report by the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, he added, "We would like to place a high priority on the methodology needed to accomplish our goal, rather than on announcing the goal itself."

Many of the participants visited the Peace Memorial Museum and joined a meeting with an A-bomb survivor during the two-day meeting. Most had high praise for the role of NGOs, one of which submitted an 11-point proposal to the forum.

❖List of the Participants in the 2nd Tokyo Forum❖ (Alphabetical order)

- Lt. Gen. Nishat Ahmad**
President of the Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad
- Dr. Zakaria Haji Ahmad**
Professor & Coordinator, National University of Malaysia, Selangor
- Amb. Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja**
Ambassador of Brazil to France
- Prof. Sergei Yevgen'evich Blagovolin**
Vice President of World Economics and International Relations Institute, Moscow
- Amb. Emilio Jorge Cardenas**
Executive Director of Hong-Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Roberts S.A., Buenos Aires
- Amb. Rolf Ekéus**
Ambassador of Sweden to the U.S.A.
- Prof. Han Sung-Joo**
Professor of Korea University, Seoul
- Amb. Ryukichi Imai**
Distinguished Scholar, Institute for International Policy Studies, Tokyo
- Dr. Joachim Krause**
Deputy Director of the Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Affairs
- Mr. Michael Krepon**
President of Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington D.C.
- Amb. Peggy Mason**
Director of Council Development, Canadian Council for International Peace and Security, Ottawa
- Prof. Robert O'Neill**
Chichele Professor of the History of War, All Souls College, University of Oxford
- Amb. Qian Jiadong**
Senior Consultant of the China Institute for International Strategic Studies, Beijing
- Dr. Abdel Monem Said Aly**
Director of the Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo
- Mr. Jasjit Singh**
Director of the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, New Delhi
- Amb. Hennadiy Udovenko**
Member of Ukrainian Parliament
- Co-chairmen-**
- Mr. Nobuo Matsunaga**
President & Director of the Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo
- Mr. Yasushi Akashi**
Then President of the Hiroshima Peace Institute, Hiroshima

Following are highlights of discussions at the forum:

The forum said it expected declared nuclear states to reach agreement on the problem of nuclear disarmament in order to maintain the NPT regime. It was recognized that a settlement among three of the states, Britain, France and China, was of great importance while START negotiations continue between Russia and the United States.

Participants pointed out that regional problems, such as nuclear weapons tests in South Asia, should be addressed within the context of global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, while registering the forum's grave concern over those tests.

The forum stressed that nuclear disarmament should be approached comprehensively, encompassing such issues as controls on the export of nuclear weapons-related materials, control of weapon delivery systems, assistance in dismantling nuclear warheads and bans on the production and disposal of nuclear fissile material for nuclear weapons.

Several concrete proposals were tabled at the meeting, reflecting a desire among participants to see clear policies on non-proliferation and disarmament incorporated into the forum's Final Report.

Proposal Needed to Break Disarmament Deadlock

By Hiromichi Umabayashi

Anti-nuclear non-governmental organizations in foreign countries do not appear to have much interest in the Tokyo Forum, nor do they expect much to come of it. This is because they have witnessed the less-than-positive attitude of the Japanese government toward nuclear disarmament. However, the Japanese government is not directly responsible for the forum. Indeed, as a member of a Japanese NGO, I believe the forum will be able to achieve a great deal.

I was encouraged by a comment Yasushi Akashi, then president of the Hiroshima Peace Institute, made at a press conference held after the second meeting. He said, "Many participants share the sense that the NPT regime will not be maintained if nuclear disarmament continues at the current pace." I hope such a sense will appear in the forum's Final Report, along with proposals emphasizing nuclear disarmament as a premise of nuclear non-proliferation.

In October 1998 the council of the Pugwash Conferences expressed concern about the current impasse in the process of nuclear disarmament. That impasse, I presume, is a common perception throughout international society. To break the deadlock, the New Agenda Coalition now comprising Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden calls on declared nuclear weapons states to "demonstrate an unequivocal commitment to the speedy and total elimination of their respective nuclear weapons." It is a remarkable demand, and one that I hope the Tokyo Forum will discuss fully.

The Final Report will be directed toward the whole of international society, not just the Japanese government. But the forum may give special consideration to the role of Japan as the only country to have been devastated by atomic weapons, in the same way that it confers special importance on the role of nuclear weapon states.

The Final Report of the Canberra Commission was submitted by the Australian government to the U.N. General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. I hope the Tokyo Forum will urge the Japanese government to use the Final Report to bring about a breakthrough in the deadlock over nuclear disarmament. For that to happen, the forum should demonstrate its work at its third meeting in New York, which will take place, with fortuitous timing, just prior to the opening of a preparatory committee for the NPT Review Conference in 2000.

Umabayashi is international coordinator of the Pacific Campaign for Disarmament and Security (PCDS).

(Translated by an HPI staff member)

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From Confrontation to Cooperation —

- Two members of Tokyo Forum call for changes in approach toward international security -

Two ambassadors from countries that have renounced the development of a nuclear capability challenged the notion of nuclear deterrence and spoke of their hopes for disarmament at an open lecture organized by HPI and the Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation on Dec.20,1998. The lecture was held to mark the second meeting of the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. Rolf Ekéus, Swedish ambassador to the United States, and Marcos de Azambuja,

Brazilian ambassador to France, both members of the forum, talked about changes in international security since the end of the Cold War, as well as the history of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

About 250 people attended the lecture, titled "In Pursuit of the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons," held at the International Conference Center in Hiroshima.

Lessons of Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Latin America



Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja

Azambuja is Brazilian Ambassador to France and Secretary General of the Ministry of External Relations. Previous posts include Special Representative and Coordinator for the Environment and Development at the United Nations, Ambassador to Argentina.

Although Latin America was not the scene of any of the major military conflicts of the 20th century, it was almost embroiled in nuclear conflict when the former Soviet Union decided to deploy nuclear missiles in Cuba, aimed toward the United States.

There can be no such thing as a localized nuclear war. When first confronted by the Cuban missile crisis, we in Latin America looked at the nuclear element with great urgency. Our initial response was to ask whether it might not be better to protect ourselves from such dangers by creating a nuclear-free zone; to take region-wide initiatives as a way of facilitating global disarmament.

At that time, the idea of non-proliferation was in its infancy. All of the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council possessed nuclear weapons, equating a nuclear capability with enhanced international status. During this period, many Latin American countries were ruled by authoritarian regimes, and it is much harder in a non-democratic society to make progress toward nuclear non-proliferation. Nuclear deterrence was the dominant philosophy, and the Cold War provided the perfect environment to nullify impulses toward peaceful means and the cause of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

Then a number of things happened that moved the debate in the direction of a more rigorous consideration of the benefits of non-proliferation.

First, people gradually realized that in developing nations, such as those in Latin America, where money is scarce and resources limited, the development of a nuclear capability is a desperate waste of resources.

Second, thanks to countries such as Japan, Germany and Sweden, we began to realize that major-power status could be achieved without the need to possess nuclear weapons. Third, the perverse nature of the logic of deterrence became more obvious, not least the realization that countries were accumulating more weapons than they could possibly use. Stockpiling such a large amount of fissile material requires continuous updating and also poses a number of ecological problems.

Finally, democracy was beginning to take hold in Latin America, with countries leaning toward cooperation, rather than the rivalry that had once characterized their relations.

By building confidence, slowly and methodically, we created an irresistible force in favor of transparency, where before there was only mistrust. The abolition of nuclear weapons will mark the end of the road. It is a feasible, realistic goal, provided we approach it pragmatically, for pragmatism is a safe way to attain idealistic objectives.

Deterrent Logic Must be Challenged

Industrialized states have come to rely more than ever on the advancement of technology to develop weaponry that is accurate and causes minimal collateral damage. In other words, the idea that strategic and technical supremacy can be achieved through mass destruction has become outmoded.

We have learned from our visit to Hiroshima that the future use of nuclear weapons would be meaningless. All our strength and effort, therefore, must be devoted to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and eventually to eliminate them altogether.

The five recognized nuclear weapons states are all signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, given that they have recognized the ultimate goal of disarmament to be the elimination of nuclear weapons, why is abolition proving so difficult to achieve?

Supporters of the nuclear deterrent say nuclear weapons prevent large-scale conflicts with conventional weapons. They say that nuclear weapons deter the use of other weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological weapons. They say that nuclear weapons have a stabilizing influence and are necessary to deter others from using them.

This is a wonderful circular argument; the idea that as long as someone else has nuclear weapons, I can never relinquish my own. Finally, they argue that disarmament is impossible to control and verify.

It is clear, however, that the use of chemical and biological weapons by one nation cannot be prevented by the mere possession by another of a nuclear weapon. It would be extremely difficult to blow up a laboratory with a nuclear weapon, for example. The logic of deterrence holds that one must be prepared to strike if threatened or fearful. In that sense, deterrence serves to destabilize.

As for verification, major advances have been made in the past few years. The major risk now is related to the lack of control over fissile material in Russia. We all should make efforts to strengthen controls of such material. I can see very real benefits if major nuclear states eliminate their nuclear arsenals. It would increase their security and enhance their stability. It would also radically diminish the threat of nuclear terrorism.



Rolf Ekéus

Ekéus has been Swedish Ambassador to the United States since September 1997. Previous posts include Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Sweden to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, and Executive Chairman of the United Nations Special Commission for Iraq.

Anti-Nuclear Group Submits Proposal to Tokyo Forum

Calls for time limit on abolition of nuclear weapons

Anti-nuclear activists and hibakusha (survivors of the atomic bombings) from Hiroshima and Nagasaki unanimously agreed late last year to submit an 11-point proposal to the second meeting of the Tokyo Forum on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.

The Hiroshima and Nagasaki Citizens' Meeting to Demand the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons, held on Dec. 12 at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, was organized by a committee comprising about 40 A-bomb survivors, scholars and representatives of civic groups with the aim of making their voice heard at the forum.

The proposal asks the forum to:

1. Delineate a time frame for the abolition of nuclear weapons.
2. Draw up detailed plans to prevent the technological transfer and "brain-drain" related to the development of nuclear weapons.
3. Demand that the United States and Russia stop sub-critical tests and cancel all attempts to modernize their nuclear arsenals.
4. Demand that nuclear weapon states conduct concrete and bona fide negotiations toward "a treaty on general and complete disarmament" as stipulated in Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
5. Call on Japan and nuclear states to support actions aimed at furthering a nuclear weapon-free world, as set out in the New Agenda Coalition.
6. Appeal to governments to endorse the advisory opinion of the International

Court of Justice on the illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

7. Propose the prompt conclusion of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.
8. Launch an international appeal for the expansion of nuclear-free zone treaties to include the Northern Hemisphere.
9. Demand that Japan hasten the passage of legislation containing its three non-nuclear principles.
10. Ask for the convening of the Fourth U.N. Special Session on Disarmament.
11. Ask that the international community listen candidly to the voices of hibakusha and to understand the terrible nature of nuclear weapons.

About 200 people attended the meeting. At a related symposium, five panelists, including A-bomb survivors, a Foreign Ministry official with responsibility for disarmament issues and a HPI researcher, exchanged views on Japan's security policy, international moves concerning NATO's nuclear strategy and other issues.

Prior to this meeting, the committee had also asked HPI and the Japan Institute of International Affairs, which co-sponsored the forum, to arrange a second meeting open to the public. It also asked them to make public the minutes of the first meeting and to arrange a meeting between members of the Tokyo Forum and the general public. It plans to hold a meeting to coincide with the third meeting of the Tokyo Forum, to be held in New York in April.

The 2nd U.N. Conference on Disarmament Convenes in Nagasaki

Indian, Pakistani N-tests give cause for concern, optimism

The 2nd U.N. Conference on Disarmament met in Nagasaki from Nov. 24 to 27, 1998. The theme of the meeting, held in the second city in Japan to have been devastated by an atomic bomb, was "Toward a World Free from Nuclear Weapons."

It was the 10th conference of its kind since the inaugural meeting was held in Kyoto in 1989, and was attended by 71 people, including ambassadors for disarmament, government officials, scholars and NGO representatives from 22 countries.

This year's conference concentrated exclusively on the disarmament issue in light of nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998. All of the plenary sessions were open to the public.

At the opening ceremony, Senji Yamaguchi, an A-bomb survivor delivered a well-received message as a representative of civil society, calling for the abolition of nuclear weapons. In addition, 400 of the 1,000 people who attended the opening ceremony were students at local middle and high schools. The ceremony was Nagasaki's attempt to link the voices of survivors of the atomic bombings with those involved in official disarmament negotiations. It also encouraged young people to participate in peace and disarmament activities.

The meeting's five plenary sessions dealt with "New Challenges to Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament," "Immediate Priorities: How to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons Capability," "Practical Nuclear Disarmament Steps," "Development of a Favorable Environment for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" and "Closing Session," respectively. There was intense discussion of the 18 papers presented at the sessions.

Defending her country's nuclear tests, Ambassador Savitri Kunadi, India's Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, said: "These tests were a measured response to a deteriorating security environment. The tests were not in violation of any treaty obligation."

Mr. Shabaz, director general for disarmament at the Pakistani Foreign Ministry said: "Pakistan had no intention of going nuclear. Our nuclear program is purely defensive and a counterweight to India. There was no other choice."

Their statements might have disappointed both non-nuclear weapons states as well as ordinary citizens, who have a genuine desire to see nuclear weapons abolished. At the same time, however, the statements may provide the international community with an opportunity to recommit itself to nuclear disarmament.

The majority of the participants agreed that the NPT regime was at risk due to the tests conducted by India and Pakistan. However, others argued that the regime was still valid because it was supported by 187 signatories. Discussions centered on ways to strengthen the treaty while bearing in mind the implications of the tests in South Asia.

For the first time a resolution was adopted that calls on conference members to:

"Encourage the cooperation among the members of the international community to move toward a world free from nuclear weapons," and to "Reaffirm their commitments to ensure that Nagasaki will remain the last city in the world to suffer from the calamity of nuclear weapons."

(By Masamichi kamiya, a visiting research fellow at HPI)

NPT Regime Requires Fundamental Remodeling

Summary of a keynote address by Yasushi Akashi, then president of the Hiroshima Peace Institute

When the Cold War ended, the international community welcomed the leadership on disarmament shown by the United States and Russia, and expressed the hope that further progress would be made toward nuclear disarmament in a global context.

At the time, much of the world appeared to be looking on with indifference – a mere bystander in superpower negotiations. But last year's nuclear tests by India and Pakistan rid those observers of their ambiguous attitude toward the disarmament process. The tests sent the message that it was wrong for non-nuclear states to let declared and threshold nuclear powers, which had come to monopolize the non-proliferation process, to continue with their own negotiations. That is the lesson we have learned from the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan.

Once a country unilaterally declares the possession of nuclear weapons, it is unable to join the NPT regime unless it relinquishes those weapons, or unless the NPT itself undergoes revision.

As it stands, the NPT offers no effective means to compel any state that has already embarked on the development of nuclear weapons to then start reversing the nuclearization process. What is needed, therefore, is a remodeling of the current NPT regime, which has fundamental flaws, rather than more attempts to impose ad hoc remedies.

Allow me to share some of the means by which the NPT regime can be rendered more effective.

First, the *raison d'être* for possessing nuclear weapons must be challenged. To do that, the military threat that compels a country to go nuclear must be reduced. Extinguishing such threats at once, of course, is impossible, particularly in regions that are prone to military conflict. But it should be possible to reduce them on an incremental basis by providing opportunities for multilateral dialog and building confidence among countries in a particular region. It is also important to provide alternative security measures that enable countries to cope with a military threat without the need for a nuclear capability, while

continuing with long-term efforts to eliminate those threats.

Second, it is important to improve surveillance of countries suspected of developing a nuclear capability. The establishment of an internationally operated satellite surveillance system should be given serious consideration.

Third, measures concerning the international flow of nuclear materials, the ban on the production of fissile materials and the strengthening of regulations on missiles and other carriers of nuclear warheads should be made more transparent.

Fourth, international society should offer stronger support for efforts by states to prevent nuclear development and proliferation. In addition to economic sanctions and other punitive measures, we should also, where necessary, assist countries suspected of developing nuclear weapons to address other problems, such as the domestic economy and standard of living.

Fifth, the five declared nuclear states (P-5) must demonstrate their commitment to and responsibility for disarmament. The immediate task is to put in place conditions necessary for the P-5 to begin comprehensive, multilateral negotiations for nuclear disarmament. Such conditions would include accelerating the ratification by Russia of START II, as well as reaching conclusions in START III and IV, both of which will reduce the number of nuclear warheads in the United States and Russia to below 1,000 each. Also, the nuclear capabilities and strategies of the P-5 should be made more transparent so that the people of the world can see, at a glance, how much progress is being made on nuclear disarmament.

There are no quick and easy solutions to the problems concerning the functions of the current NPT regime. But it is extremely important to combine the five suggestions I have mentioned above along with other measures, and to persist with them boldly and resolutely. In doing so, I hope and believe we will see improvements in the international political climate.

U.N. Disarmament Conferences in Japan: Their Genesis and Implications

By Masamichi Kamiya

Three factors are behind the decision to hold a U.N. Disarmament Conference in Japan, notwithstanding the suggestion that they be held there by then Japanese Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita at a Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament (SSOD III) in 1988.

First, the United Nations decided to embark on a regional approach to disarmament in the early 1980s. Second, the organization established regional centres for peace and disarmament, and third, it began exerting strong leadership on the process of disarmament.

Member states of the United Nations declared in the final document of SSOD I in 1978: "[T]he United Nations should facilitate and encourage all disarmament measures - unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral..." Furthermore, at SSOD II in 1982, the organization launched the World Disarmament Campaign, aimed at coordinating disarmament initiatives at the global, regional and national levels. In short, the international community became determined to formulate a framework for multilateral and regional approaches to disarmament, paralleling bilateral disarmament negotiations between the United States and the former Soviet Union. By expanding the scope of disarmament, not only government officials but also scholars, NGOs and journalists began playing a role in a holistic, regional approach to disarmament.

The U.N. Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament played a substantive role in promoting the regional approach to disarmament by providing a forum for dialogue. So far, similar U.N. centres have been opened in Lome, Togo (1985), in Lima, Peru (1986), and in Kathmandu, Nepal (1987). The Kathmandu centre has been responsible for organizing successive disarmament conferences in Japan.

The same centre has also organized annual regional conferences on

disarmament in Kathmandu since January 1989. The first was held shortly before the first conference in Japan, in Kyoto. The 10th Kathmandu conference was held in February 1998.

Like the conferences in Japan, the meetings in Kathmandu, now referred to as the "Kathmandu Process," represent an important initiative by the U.N. centre. Both sets of meetings are an integral part of the centre's work in the Asia-Pacific region. The centre played a particularly worthwhile role in encouraging dialogue between North Korea and South Korea, and in promoting other confidence-building measures in the Asia-Pacific.

By convening the three General Assembly Special Sessions on Disarmament, and by promoting a regional approach to disarmament and establishing the regional centres, the United Nations has demonstrated stealthy leadership. Yasushi Akashi, then president of the Hiroshima Peace Institute, once wrote in a newspaper: "As U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament, I came up with the idea of holding a disarmament conference in Japan, with three objectives in mind." The first objective was to reinvigorate governmental disarmament negotiations, which had reached stagnation point, by utilizing the expertise of scholars and NGOs.

Second, Akashi wanted the international community to recognize Japan's aspirations in the fields of peace and disarmament as the only nation to have experienced the devastation of nuclear weapons.

Third, he wanted the Japanese people in turn to understand the *realpolitik* of disarmament in international affairs. The United Nations' leadership paved the way for the multilateralization of the disarmament process, in which not only government officials but also scholars, NGO representatives and ordinary citizens are involved at various levels.

Having participated in conferences both in Japan and Nepal since their inception, I can identify a certain characteristic at the 1998 conference in Nagasaki. At previous conferences, two distinctive, but parallel sets of arguments were never combined: namely, the realistic view held by some governments that disarmament ought to proceed step by step, and the idealistic view of civil society that all nuclear weapons should be abolished as early as possible. It seemed that the gap between the two schools was too wide to bridge. A good illustration of this gap is the so-called "time-bound" framework for nuclear disarmament asserted by non-nuclear weapons states when addressing nuclear weapons states.

However, participants at the Nagasaki Conference were given cause for optimism. The two sides mentioned above seemed to come together in their shared goal of nuclear disarmament, sensing that they would be able to agree on pragmatic ways to achieve that common objective. These ideas were discussed in specific terms at the Nagasaki conference.

There is reason to be hopeful that this realistic and gradual approach to disarmament, initiated by governments, and the genuine desire for peace and disarmament among ordinary people, including the citizens of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, will complement each other in bringing about nuclear disarmament.

But it should also be pointed out that it will not be easy to turn the above-mentioned optimism into real progress. It is essential, therefore, that an innovative opinion leader emerge that is capable of bringing together diverse views, and of voicing the concerns of civil society to achieve this shared goal. In this respect, I believe the Hiroshima Peace Institute has a vital role to play in contributing to peace and disarmament.

Kamiya is a visiting research fellow at HPI.

The Role of Hiroshima in the 21st Century

By Takashi Hiraoka

On July 16, 1945, a nuclear weapon was successfully tested for the first time at Alamogordo, New Mexico in the United States. Since that day, mankind has been living with the horror of nuclear weapons, and continues to do so as the 20th century draws to an end.

The superpower rivalry between the former Soviet Union and the United States accelerated the build up of nuclear weapons. The international community stood by in horror as the Cuban missile crisis unfolded, while Britain, France and China began to develop their own nuclear weapons capability.

So why has the nuclear button not been pushed? Because the memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has constantly reminded leaders of major powers and the international community at large of the catastrophe that nuclear weapons can bring. In this respect, the experience of those cities has played an important role.

Nevertheless, nuclear weapons still exist. Because the end of the Cold War gave people the impression that the threat of nuclear war had dissipated, opportunities to build a new world order and accelerate nuclear disarmament were lost. Nuclear weapons, along with their delivery systems, remain at the core of so-called nuclear deterrence in international politics.

Under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, nuclear weapons states are attempting to maintain their monopoly on the ownership of nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan have protested at what they see as the discriminatory character of the NPT regime by conducting underground nuclear tests last year. The tests exposed the contradictory and limited nature of the NPT regime.

How can the discriminatory character of the treaty be remedied? One way would be to allow all states to possess nuclear weapons. But that approach would merely fuel the proliferation of nuclear weapons with possibly catastrophic consequences.

More realistically, the situation can only be remedied by urging all states not to possess such destructive weapons, thereby ensuring the equality of all states.

The International Court of Justice stipulates: "The threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law..." Nuclear weapons are inhumane. The abolition of nuclear weapons has become the common view of the international community.

I have learned from my time in Hiroshima about the misery nuclear weapons can cause. In order to conquer the myth of deterrence, I strongly believe it is

necessary to demonstrate the injustice of the possession and use of nuclear weapons, and to stress their truly evil character from a human perspective.

Hiroshima has long raised its voice against the inhumanity of nuclear weapons through the powerful experiences of hibakusha - the survivors of the atomic bombings. At the same time, it is a fact that cruelty and misery of a different kind to the one experienced in Hiroshima exist in other parts of the world.

It is, therefore, essential that we develop a new human-centered strategy for peace, while being careful not to depend too heavily on the experiences of hibakusha, because they will inevitably become fewer in number as time passes.

The superpowers attempt to justify the possession of nuclear weapons. Hiroshima, on the other hand, opposes their possession and their innately inhuman nature. The people of Hiroshima have tried to convey the lessons of the city's experience in an attempt to fill the gap between the two sides.

In addition to their destructive power, the horror of nuclear weapons is also evident in the form of radiation, which causes long-term damage to the body. Since radiation is invisible, it is extremely difficult to remind people of the threat it poses. It is impossible, though, to inherit the psychological pain of hibakusha directly affected by the atomic bombings. On that front, we must do as much as possible to emphasize with those people and try to share in their suffering. It is our duty to find a way to communicate the misery of Hiroshima to every single member of the international community, no matter what it takes.

Some critics say that, although Hiroshima is to be praised for its moral opposition to nuclear weapons, the city alone cannot prevent or end violence in the international community.

But as long as stockpiles of nuclear weapons pose a threat to humanity, we must pursue peace and security through their abolition.

There are two ways, political and civil, to attain this objective. At the political level, we need to recognize the distinction between global issues such as the START negotiations between the United States and Russia, and regional issues, such as the expansion of Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones. At the level of civil society, we need to emphasize the strength of public opinion as a factor in nurturing an environment conducive to

disarmament.

The power of NGOs and the mass media, evident in the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, is a good example.

In the meantime, the international community must re-evaluate the role of science and technology in contemporary society so that we can approach the next century with optimism.

In July 1997, the United States conducted a series of sub-critical nuclear weapons tests at the underground Nevada Test Site. A television station that covered the tests showed scientists and engineers involved in the project applauding with joy. It was a chilling sight. For scientists and engineers, a nuclear weapon test may simply be an experiment that is of professional interest. They may be happy just to see their experiment succeed. But they do not foresee the misery that will be the logical conclusion of their experiments.

Their collaboration in developing weapons of destruction, whether conscious or not, is akin to those involved in the Manhattan Project, or the members of the AUM Supreme Truth cult who produced sarin gas with a view to mass and indiscriminate murder. Nuclear weapons are developed in laboratories far from the public eye, free from the mushroom clouds and bubbling seas that accompany tests. That will not change as long as nuclear states remain dependent on these terrible weapons.

The invisible dangers of radiation and experiments with nuclear weapons are manifestations of science and technology in the 20th century.

Humans, of course, have the know-how and technology to make nuclear weapons. Given that nuclear weapons will only be abolished through our own efforts, the threat those weapons pose will not disappear until the people of the world transform themselves into those who truly love and cherish peace. The experiences of Hiroshima and Auschwitz prove that to be the case; they are reminders that the world has, and will continue to disobey reason.

The role of Hiroshima in the 21st century will first be to deny the validity of nuclear weapons, whose rationale can only be equated with genocide, and second, to rediscover the value of science and technology to civilization by remembering the tragedy of Hiroshima.

*Takashi Hiraoka is former mayor of Hiroshima
(Translated by Masamichi Kamiya)*

The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations Toward A Nuclear-Free World

By Joseph Caron

The Ottawa Process led to the international treaty to ban anti-personnel land mines (APLMs), signed by 122 countries, including Japan, in Ottawa in December 1997. It formally entered into force on Sept. 16, 1998, with the 40th ratification and on March 1, 1999, it has become binding international law for each of the countries that has ratified it. What lessons emerged from the Ottawa Process? Which ones could be applied to the international efforts to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons?

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction is significant, most importantly, for the following reasons.

First, there is a clear and unambiguous feeling among the international community that APLMs are inhumane weapons which must be banned. Thanks to the globalization of television, we see pictures every week that graphically illustrate the horrid effect of these indiscriminate weapons. Indeed most of the victims are civilians, for these tools of war continue to kill long after the soldiers have left the battlefield.

Second, the Ottawa Process pushed the boundaries of multilateral diplomacy in several important ways. The policy circle that was necessary to develop APLMs strategies was aggressively widened to include actors not usually integrated in diplomatic processes, especially for international security and disarmament:

- 1) Non-government organizations (NGOs), both global organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and national, such as Mines Action Canada and the Association to Aid Refugees in Japan;
- 2) The media, which served to educate broad swathes of the interested public in virtually all countries where APLMs were of interest;
- 3) Internationally known personalities, such as Princess Diana and former Prime Minister Nakasone, who even painted one of the most effective posters of the campaign.
- 4) Finally, many governments played a central role, without which bureaucracies might not have been mobilized: Austria, Belgium, Norway, the Philippines and South Africa in addition to Canada, tirelessly campaigned in the world's chanceries and foreign ministries, and exercised moral leadership.

This widening of the policy circle began in Geneva in 1996, in the margins of a review conference on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. Governments and NGOs that shared a sense of urgency on the APLMs issue agreed that traditional channels of diplomacy would not suffice. This was followed by a series of informal consultations, and in

October 1996, by a formal meeting in Ottawa with 50 pro-Ban governments, 24 observer governments and numerous NGO and media representatives. At the end of that conference, Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy courageously challenged the international community to return to Ottawa a year later to sign a convention banning landmines outright.

A series of regional meetings and consultations around the world culminated in the negotiation and signing of the convention in December 1997. In parallel, we worked closely with NGOs to build grassroots support for this new convention.

Why would a government want to involve NGOs in a policy-making process? Because NGOs can do things which governments cannot. It is our firm belief that the activities of the myriad of groups within the international campaign were the most important driving force against APLMs. The remarkable "coalition of the willing" continues in the implementation phase, or "Ottawa Process II." The Canadian and other governments want and need NGO and media engagement in the infinitely more arduous task of removing the 100 million or so mines buried in 72 countries around the world and rendering assistance to the thousands upon thousands of victims who must learn to live with their injuries, most of which threaten their livelihoods, if not their lives.

Some lessons relevant to our topic of discussion were identified at the "Ottawa Process Forum," hosted by the Canadian government, to take stock of the process.

- 1) A clear, humanitarian message was essential to the success of the process. Only a total, verifiable and complete ban on APLMs would solve the problem. This forced governments to make basic policy choices, and made it easier for the pro-Ban forces to deliver the same message throughout the world.
- 2) Humanitarian norms do matter. The humanitarian merits of the issue were essential in convincing governments to sign the convention. It was not, fundamentally, an arms control issue. Because of the visibly devastating effect of the mines long after a war had ceased, it was ultimately possible to go around the traditional arms control community and appeal directly to governments and interest groups on the basis of humanitarian arguments. The treaty contributes to establish a new international humanitarian norm that influences even non-signatory states.
- 3) Middle powers may now have a greater opportunity to influence global affairs, using instruments such as cooperation with NGOs, and effective communications with the media. The principal government actors in the campaign were Austria, Belgium,

Canada, Norway, the Philippines, South Africa and many other countries with credible track records on international issues, but none could be defined as a great power.

- 4) Partnership pays. NGOs had a significant influence upon many actors, including public opinion, media, governments, the U.N. and regional organizations. The continued involvement of NGOs and continued NGO-government cooperation is essential to the implementation of the convention.

I must caution you that there is a real debate on these conclusions, particularly their applicability to other arms control issues, and as to whether the "Ottawa Process Model" is really a model at all. Every issue requires a tailored approach. Yet, some factors should be highlighted and a few lessons can be drawn.

The success of the Ottawa Process was based on many years of cultivating public awareness, sometimes by very high profile public figures. It revolved around a straightforward issue on which there was significant common ground between governments, and among governments and NGOs. Other issues may simply not be "ripe" enough for an Ottawa-style Process.

Crucially, the military community was of two minds on land mines. The ICRC commissioned a highly informed study of their utility in contemporary battle, with pros and cons, impact assessment and examples of historical usage. It came down firmly in favour of a ban. Similarly, letters to President Clinton from senior US officers, starting with General Scharzkoff, gave tremendous credibility to the argument against these weapons.

A first lesson is that a broad community of interests must be brought together to wage an effective campaign. The Ottawa Process focused on NGOs: other might find allies among academics, public commentators, senior statesmen and political figures, even the business community.

Second, the issue must be focused, straightforward, clearly articulated and consistently argued. Truly global issues, be they nuclear weapons reduction or climate change, are simply too complex and engage too many interest groups to be amenable to swift and united action.

Third, for public education to take place, issues must capture media attention, over a very long period of time, reduced to a series of easily understood and highly visual messages.

All of this argues for addressing arms control and disarmament questions one by one and choosing issues that can capture public imagination and interest. It argues for serious and concerted policy development involving all major interested parties, not only government.

Caron is Assistant Deputy Minister for Asia-Pacific & Africa, Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Workshop Mulls Stagnation in Disarmament Process

The Hiroshima Peace Institute held a workshop in Tokyo on Dec. 4, 1998. The aim of the workshop was to generate input for the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, which took place on Dec. 18 and 19 in Hiroshima. The workshop featured lectures by invited specialists on nuclear issues, followed by discussions with HPI members and other participants.

The invited speakers were Prof. Masahiko Asada of Okayama University, who talked about "Positive and Negative Security Assurances," Fumiaki Nishiwaki, associate professor at the Defense Academy, whose lecture was titled "The Nuclear Situation in the South Asia and the Problem of Japan's Nuclear Umbrella," and Hiromichi Umebayashi, a coordinator of the Pacific Campaign for Disarmament and Security, with a lecture titled "Toward Nuclear Disarmament: Current Issues."

Asada examined whether positive and negative security assurances were effective for the security of non-nuclear weapon states, and how much they could contribute to nuclear disarmament, as well as their relation to the no first-use policy.

He analyzed the conditions under which negative security assurance to be provided by nuclear weapons states to non-nuclear weapons states should be applied, and the practice of positive security assurance. He then discussed ways in which negative security assurance could serve Japan's security, particularly in relation to the situation on the Korean Peninsula and China.

Nishiwaki discussed the motivation and background behind India's nuclear tests from the political perspective of the ruling BJP, particularly its perception of the international environment. The Bharatiya Janata Party, he explained, believes that while international relations have shifted from a bipolar toward a multipolar system in the post-Cold War period, it suspects some countries, notably the United States, have tried to establish a hegemonic order to benefit their own interests.

The BJP regards the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) as part of such plans, and says India must claim its right to equal national sovereignty,

Nishiwaki explained. The party perceives economic development as an inseparable part of India's national security, and it is in this context that the nuclear and missile technology programs are promoted.

Summing up, he said that the BJP's goal is to facilitate India's resurgence as a "benign global power." India's pursuit of the nuclear option, he said, had been driven by its desire to take its rightful place in international society, and to challenge the United States' bid to establish its superiority, even in times of peace.

In his comments on Asada's presentation, Umebayashi said the issue of nuclear disarmament had undergone a qualitative change, because it now involved non-nuclear, as well as the small circle of nuclear states. Given that change, he said, there needed to be a clarification of the relationship between negative security assurance and no-first use policy.

He also drew attention to a section of the Agreed Framework, concluded between the United States and North Korea, which implied that the United States had pledged not to use nuclear weapons against North Korea. He raised the question of whether this was consistent with the United States' non-commitment to no-first-use.

Umebayashi also commented on Nishiwaki's interpretation of the United States' national security strategy. He pointed out that national security had become a significant part of the United States' national and foreign policy strategies, rather than a purely military strategy, which, he suggested, reflected its relative decline as an economic power.

He said that the New Agenda Coalition, driven by a worldwide perception that nuclear disarmament had stagnated, was significant due to its vision of a more comprehensive approach to disarmament issues.

After the presentations, workshop participants discussed the New Agenda Coalition, as well as the possibility of introducing legally binding powers to enforce negative security assurance, particularly with regard to the aforementioned section in the Agreed Framework. Other issues up for discussion included the utility of nuclear weapons, and the efficacy of the deterrence theory.

(By Nobumsa Akiyama, a research associate at HPI)

Research Project Report ① Toward Building Peace and Disarmament Database

As a result of the growing importance in today's world of information technology and the media, people have unhindered access to a vast amount of information on a daily basis. The problem lies in deciding which information is necessary, and which can be ignored.

In some cases, information is simply wrong, or at least designed to mislead. Nevertheless, it can be said that the world we live in has been made more convenient because of the information revolution. However, we should remind ourselves that we are also in danger of being exposed to information overkill.

Of course, information related to the military or peace should be treated with care because of national security considerations. In that sense, the state should be the primary holder of such information.

However, the development of weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear weapons, and the unregulated transfer of arms to conflict-prone regions pose a danger on a global level. It is certainly true that secrecy regarding a country's military capability has led to a build-up of arms in the past.

In the 1950s, for example, the United States grossly overestimated the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal for this very reason. At the time, many American policy makers believed that the United States might have fallen behind the Soviet Union in its nuclear capability. The so-called "Missile Gap" situation induced both superpowers into further nuclear expansion. In reality, the number of nuclear weapons possessed by the Soviet Union was far smaller than that of the United States, although that fact did not come to light until later.

This example tells us that it is better to make military information open to some extent, and to share it to promote transparency. This will make it possible to prevent conflict and promote disarmament. These days, such information is more readily available than ever before. However, the process is still difficult, and the information we are left with may be both voluminous and complex. Databases have been developed to store and make easily available large amounts of information. They enable us to access the data and information we need at any time.

Several peace research institutes, such as the Monterey Institute of International Studies in the United States and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in Sweden, collect and arrange bulky data and then make it available, free of charge or at a price, via the Internet, journals and other publications.

In Japan, no database exists that deals with peace and disarmament information, at least nothing comparable with those of other countries. To remedy the situation, HPI is to conduct a feasibility study into the setting up of a database as one of its priorities (4th Research Project). Ahead of the feasibility study itself, we are in the process—which began last autumn—of deciding what kind of data is required, and how it will be presented on the database.

So far, we have taken a detailed look at the quality and user-friendliness of five sophisticated databases. We plan to complete the first stage of our evaluation by March, 1999.

(By Ikuko Togo, a lecturer at HPI)

A Visit to Research Organizations in the U.S. and Europe

Despite being busy preparing for the second meeting of the Tokyo Forum in Hiroshima, I found time to visit several research organizations in the United States and Europe for about five days in November 1998, at the suggestion of then HPI President Yasushi Akashi.

The main aims of my trip were to learn about the management skills of prominent overseas research organizations, to build an international research network, to exchange views with foreign researchers and to explain the work of the Hiroshima Peace Institute.

During my trip I visited the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, D.C., the International Institute for Security Studies (IISS) in London, The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California.

I had the opportunity to talk with more than 30 researchers, including the presidents of three research institutes. Most of the people I met were specialists in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, Northeast Asian security and South Asian issues.

As a member of HPI, which was only set up about a year ago, I found that I had many questions to ask, including some very basic ones, such as "What is the goal of this institution?" "How is the institute managed?" and "What is your definition of peace?"

In answer to the last question, Dr. Adam Daniel Rotfeld, president of SIPRI, offered a thoughtprovoking answer. "Peace," he said, "is similar to health. We don't discuss definitions of peace here at SIPRI. Instead, we

are more interested in how to prevent conflict."

Thinking of solutions to ill-health is certainly more important than tangling with a definition of health, especially if you are working at an international institute with people from diverse backgrounds.

Second, I was able to gain some insights into Northeast Asian issues from three researchers at the Henry L. Stimson Center: Benjamin L. Self, Kenneth W. Allen and Joel Wit.

We discussed what constitutes a threat in the region. The threat, according to one school of thought, stems from a perception gap among nations concerning specific political, economic, diplomatic and military issues. This creates a communication problem, which in turn leads to misunderstandings. That core issue of communication is more dangerous than a single event, such as the launching by North Korea of the Taepodong missile over Japan last year.

I learned a great deal, from the collection of materials and publications, to building databases, to the practical skills required to run an international research body.

Despite my lateness in arranging visits to each institute, the briefings, meetings and interviews were extremely helpful. I would like to end by thanking all the people, too numerous to mention by name, involved in making my visit so worthwhile and enjoyable.

(By Kazumi Mizumoto, an associate professor at HPI)

Hello from HPI



New researcher at HPI

MASAMICHI KAMIYA

Visiting Research Fellow

Kamiya specializes in international organizations and disarmament issues. After graduating from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, he spent seven years in Geneva and New York assisting the World Conference on Religion and

Peace (WCRP), a U.N.-accredited non-governmental organization. Kamiya has been involved in disarmament and security issues as a member of both the NGO Committee for Disarmament in Geneva and the NGO Committee on Disarmament in New York. After leaving his post as an Associate Secretary-General of WCRP, he became a visiting research fellow at HPI in November 1998. He was born in Yokohama.

Akashi resigns from HPI

Akashi resigned as president of HPI on Feb.19,1999

DIARY

Oct.1,1998 - Feb.28,1999

Oct. 15

HPI President Yasushi Akashi delivers a lecture "World Media From View Point of the United Nations" at the 51st National Newspaper Convention, sponsored by the Japan Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association at Hiroshima International Conference Center.

Oct. 17

Akashi delivers speech at a meeting of the Japan Association of International Relations at Shimane International College.

Oct. 22-27

Akashi attends a forum titled "U.N. Responses to Insecurity," organized by the Academic Council on the United Nations System sponsored by the Kemp Fund of Yale University. He delivers a lecture titled "Humanitarian Action at the Crossroads."

Nov. 10-20

Kazumi Mizumoto visits four U.S. and European research institutes: the International Institute for Security Studies, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the Henry L. Stimson Center and the Monterey Institute of International Studies.

Nov. 24

Akashi, Mizumoto, Ikuko Togo, Nobumasa Akiyama and Masamichi Kamiya attend the Second Meeting of the Second United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues in Nagasaki sponsored by the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs and the United Nations Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, at Nagasaki Brick Hall.

Dec. 4

A Workshop is held at Akasaka Prince Hotel.

Dec. 9-10

Akashi, Mizumoto and Kamiya attend an international symposium titled "Korea and the Search for Peace in Northeast Asia," sponsored, and held at, Ritsumeikan University.

Dec. 18-19

The Second Meeting of the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and

Disarmament is held at Hiroshima International Conference Center.

Dec. 20

A commemorative open lecture titled "In Pursuit of the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons" is held to mark the Tokyo Forum in Hiroshima, sponsored by the Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation and HPI.

Jan. 31

Akashi and Mizumoto meet representatives of seven organizations for A-bomb survivors in Hiroshima.

Feb. 10

Akashi delivers a special lecture at Hiroshima City University.

Feb. 19

Akashi delivers a keynote address at a symposium titled "Russian and Asia-Pacific Security," co-organized by SIPRI and the Japan Institute of International Studies, and the Asahi Shimbun.

Visitors to HPI

Oct.9

General Council of the Federal Republic of Germany Dr. Johannes Preisinger visits HPI

Nov. 19

Members of the working committee of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki Citizens' Meeting Demanding the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons visit HPI.

Nov. 26

New Zealand Ambassador to Japan Neil Walter, and Glenys Karan, second secretary at the New Zealand Embassy, visit HPI.

Nov. 27

Dr. Linda Groff, a professor at California State University, visits HPI.

Jan.27

Mehed Halilovic, editor of "Oslobojene," a journal in Bosnia-Herzegovina, visits Tokyo Office of HPI.

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