Peace and Conflict Drivers: Spillover and Mutual Reinforcement Between Traditional and Non-Traditional Security Paradigms

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This article seeks to reinvigorate discussion on the role of sub-state security considerations as international security policy determinants, and drivers of peace and security outcomes. Like the works of various liberal authors, it challenges the belief that diplomats should ignore the internal affairs of states in order to preserve international stability. Unlike liberal moral theorising or “idealism”, it takes a rational rather than normative approach to assessing the importance of internal constituencies and pressures. It may well be the right thing from the perspective of shared humanity to take an interest in the human security of the most vulnerable sections of international society, but it also makes sense from the perspective of a national interest in peace and security on the regional and global stages.

The article critiques the parsimonious and state-centric dictates of both realist and (neo)liberal ideology in terms of how best to deal with “rogue” regimes and insecure international operating environments. Regarding states as unitary rational actors misses alternative explanations for the behaviour of statesmen, leads to the adoption of self-fulfilling worst-case-scenario planning, is inherently confrontational, and contributes to the likelihood of the emergence of a traditional security dilemma whereby an increase in one state’s capabilities is considered a threat to the security of its neighbours. Indeed, the internal weakness of rogue states rather than strength can pose the greatest threat to international peace and security.

Thus a critical stance is warranted towards the exclusive use of traditional security analysis in terms of conceptual area, rational implications, and referent object. State-centric security considerations can filter down to the level of human security, and in turn further destabilize a fragile regime, while the internal dynamics of sub-state structures and threats at the level of individual wellbeing can percolate up to pressure the leadership. This paper emphasizes the interconnectedness of human security and national/international security. This in turn demonstrates the need for a broadening of both referent objects and policy
arena with regard to peace and security. It further provides an overview of the relationships between traditional, non-traditional/new, comprehensive, and human security studies, and expands the discussion on narrow and broad approaches to human security.

**Traditional Security Perspectives**

In the Post-9-11 operating environment, realism resurgent perceives the international environment as an anarchic society governed by a balance of power, rejecting questions of “right” in favour of an amoral evaluation of an objective criterion termed “national interest”. The realist position is a pessimistic, cynical one, but one that supporters claim reflects a true picture of the way states interact. For realists, in a condition of international anarchy, or at best a very limited international system of minimal rules to ensure coexistence, the “rational” policy is to pursue goals without care to the costs that might be incurred by others, and to maximize one’s chances of achieving ends in the face of opposition through the pursuit of power. This results in a war of all against all with no collective production of goods.¹

Liberal security theories are therefore attacked for their unfounded optimism or “idealism” in believing that international society could be made like domestic society simply by relying upon man’s better nature, and the rational good sense of the populations of democratic regimes.

Under anarchic conditions there is a rational imperative to pursue national interest regardless of the costs to others; and in the absence of any other force with the authority or power to compel obedience to any other rules or principles, it makes sense to maximize one’s chances of achieving goals and protecting national interest by striving for more power than that possessed by one’s competitors. Recognition of the primacy of the national interests becomes “both the dictate of prudence and the moral obligation of politicians”.² Realism does not, however, reject consistently such normative considerations. National interest itself is a normative and essentially contested concept rather than an objective criterion. Thus, as a moral argument, realism amounts to a claim that the reasons for overriding the constraints of ordinary morality in emergency situations are themselves moral.³ Following on from these considerations, the concept of security in international affairs is conventionally defined as the protection of the territorial integrity, stability, and vital interests of states through the use of political, legal, or military instruments at the state or international level.⁴

The major concerns have revolved around the concepts of military capabilities (both offensive and defensive), the distribution and balance of power in the international system in terms of polarity and concentration in the hands of the dominant states, and policy prescription in terms of the strategic implications of these considerations, including offensive (power projection), defensive, and deterrent spending. Strategic analysis built on
these traditional security assumptions reflects a conception of rational behaviour based upon calculating decision-making by unitary actors. These actors (states or statesmen acting on their behalf) rank potential outcomes in accordance with a preferential hierarchy and coldly assess the costs and benefits associated with different courses of action independently of “emotional tensions, sentimentality, crowd behaviour, or other irrational motivation”.\(^5\)

The state is considered to be, if not the only legitimate actor, at the very least the most influential, and with the capacity to coerce the behaviour of the other actors. In addition, the state is often used as a convenient unit of analysis. Hans Morgenthau has postulated that such a model “provides for rational discipline in action and creates that outstanding continuity in foreign policy which makes [it] appear as an intelligible, rational continuum ... regardless of the different motives, preferences, and intellectual and moral qualities of successive statesmen”\(^6\). This representation of security decision-making has been variously referred to as the “rational calculation model” or more commonly the “Rational Actor Model” or simply RAM.\(^7\) Generations of strategic analysts and policy advisers have relied on the concept of protagonists as single unitary rational actors when drawing up scenarios through which the decision-making environment of the target can be altered in favour of producing outcomes preferred by the agent.

Policy preferences are based on a rational calculation of the costs of carrying out an action combined with the probability and scale of (from the perspective of the actor) an improved post-action operating environment. For instance, in terms of determining whether to go to war, a potential aggressor will calculate how great the costs will be of carrying the attack through to a successful conclusion, and how great the difference will be between the \textit{pre-bellum} and \textit{post-bellum status quo}. If a state wishes to persuade an aggressor not to attack one or both of these variables must be altered. This can be done through strategic acts involves defensive measures, such as building fortifications, developing weapons which inflict unacceptable casualties on attacking forces, or mustering forces that look forbiddingly strong. Alternatively, in contrast to dissuasion by defence, dissuasion by deterrence operates by frightening an opponent out of attacking, not because of the difficulty of launching an attack and carrying it home, but because the expected reaction of the attacked will result in one’s own severe punishment.

Thus the conflictual relationship between potential antagonists can be managed in two ways. First, through the promotion of defensive dominance by ensuring that force structures, strategies, and arms control agreements are crafted to minimize the role of technologies that facilitate offensive operations and boost those that aid defensive tactics. When the defence has the advantage over the offense, a large increase in one state’s security only slightly decreases the security of others, and status-quo powers can all enjoy a high
level of security and largely escape the security dilemma generated by the state of nature. Second, by making the deterrent stakes so high that no matter the level of unhappiness with the status quo, no protagonist is likely to be willing to risk the consequences of resorting to the use of force.

Thus, from a realist perspective, in order to preserve their security in an anarchic international operating environment, states must primarily rely upon self-help (rather than external agencies) building sufficient military capacity to defend against or deter armed attack. Peace and security under such conditions amounts to relative freedom from war, coupled with a relatively high expectation that defeat will not be a consequence should war occur.8

Liberal internationalist perspectives have long rejected this pessimistic and selfish approach to dealing with conflict and securing international peace. Rather than focusing on state security, liberal internationalists have emphasised collective and systemic security, as well as policy prescription channelled through the medium of international organisations. Indeed, the process and manifestation of international organization has fundamentally, even though not exclusively, long been held to encapsulate a reaction to the problem of war. The Covenant of the League of Nations, the world’s first general, universal, permanent international organization, and the forerunner of the United Nations (UN) was formed out of the first 26 articles of Treaty of Versailles (the peace treaty that formally ended World War I). The League embodied the concept of collective security, wherein peace is indivisible, and if any state attacked another, all the remaining states in the international system would be obliged to come to the aid of the victim. Under such conditions, aggression becomes an irrational policy choice as a potential aggressor would be confronted with the power of an overwhelming coalition and could therefore not hope to profit from such actions. Should war nevertheless occur, this overwhelming coalition would also be able to bring the aggressor quickly to heel. In addition, liberal internationalist perspectives emphasize the need to provide alternative peaceful resolutions of dispute mechanisms in order to avoid the tendency of states to resolve their differences through recourse to violent conflict. In other words, from a liberal internationalist perspective, security “implies both coercive means to check an aggressor and all manner of persuasion, bolstered by the prospect of mutually shared benefits, to transform hostility into cooperation”.9

Meanwhile, using similar theoretical tools to those of realists and their allies, economically focused neoliberals seek to demonstrate how the rationality of utility-maximising states can nevertheless lead to co-operation rather than conflict. They also resemble realists in claiming value-free criteria for their analysis and in doing so rejecting
the normative, prescriptive nature of other liberal approaches. They emphasise that the national interest of states is not to be found exclusively in the realm of power maximisation, but rather places a high priority upon economic well-being. By demonstrating, through repeat-play or iterated prisoners’ dilemma game theoretical modelling and related concepts, that states and their subjects will be better off in absolute terms through co-operation in the pursuit of mutually beneficial projects, they argue that a form of international society can emerge in the absence of an overarching hegemon with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. States not only need to co-exist, they need each other to prosper. As a result, there is a significant degree of interdependence in international relations.

Neoliberal strategic approaches essentially work on the other end of the equation outlined above. An opponent is likely to embark on a course of action that will result in an outcome detrimental to one’s interests if for them the costs of the action are less than the difference between an unhappy status quo and a happier post-bellum operating environment. So rather than increasing the costs to them of the action (defence), or decreasing the desirability to them of the outcome (deterrence), one can instead increase the desirability of the status quo. The conflict of interests is resolved through a process of making everybody better off economically through cooperation and the generation of collective goods. Optimism about the eventual pacific effects of modern capitalist development models is perhaps most famously summed up by Francis Fukuyama in his “End of History” hypothesis, whereby a liberal victory in both the economic and political realms leads to a situation where there is no more ideological conflict.\(^\text{10}\)

Functionalist theory further supports these ideas and processes. According to David Mitrany, collective governance and “material interdependence” develops its own internal dynamic as states integrate in limited functional, technical, and/or economic areas.\(^\text{11}\) This promotes a peaceful outlook among actors because everybody is made better off by cooperation, because economic interdependence increases the cost of war and the benefits of peace (status quo) and because cooperation “spills over” into the high political sphere of security through the establishment of a culture of cooperation rather than conflict. Thus neoliberals and functionalists advocate further economic development, integration, and modernization as a panacea for making the world a better place, for making everybody better off, and for reducing both material incentives and metaphysical desires for waging war, thereby “resolving” conflict.

These parsimonious approaches to international security have, however, increasingly come under attack for both their normative and practical limitations. Contemporary security concerns have proliferated far beyond the threats states pose to one another. During the bipolar Cold War conflict between the United States and the Soviet
Union, with the looming shadow of mutually assured destruction (MAD), it is not surprising that the focus was upon state and systemic survival. Yet as intra-state conflicts or conflicts involving non-state actors have sharply increased since the end of the Cold War, the international community struggled to respond effectively. The complexity of the many perils tended to involve transnational dimensions and moved beyond national security, which focused solely on the threat of external military aggressions. As the range of threats has broadened and varied, the concept of security has also expanded the scope along both the theoretical X-axis of adding non-traditional concerns to those of traditional security analysis and along the practical Y-axis of adding different levels of security analysis from the global, through the regional, to the sub-state, community, and individual. 

Likewise, with democratization of the media, it has become harder for governments to perpetrate, cover up, or turn a blind eye to inhumane practices within their jurisdictions or within those of fellow states simply by referencing “national interest”. In an increasingly interconnected world, with heavy penetration of states by new media, and high levels of personal contact between the peoples of different states, ideas and norms are now able to diffuse much more rapidly, and state monopoly control of knowledge and opinion-forming is increasingly undermined. This paper suggests a coming together of these two elements -- a happy coincidence of state-centric security interests and the provision of security for the most vulnerable at the level of individual human beings. The next section addresses the evolution of the contemporary discourse on international security.

Non-traditional Perspectives on Security
In contemporary discourse and increasingly in practice, security is an essentially contested concept. Definitions ranging from the traditional state-centric one of a relative freedom from war, coupled with a relatively high expectation that defeat will not be a consequence of any war that should occur; through the systemic implying both coercive means to check an aggressor and alternative means for reconciling conflicting interests; to the consideration of insecurity or vulnerabilities -- both internal and external -- that threaten or have the potential to bring down or weaken state structures. The contradiction between state and systemic security is exposed by the concept of relative certainty of victory if one goes to war in the former, and the collective security principle and rationale of relative certainty of defeat of an aggressor in the latter. Beyond these essentially contested rational imperatives, security is also contested in terms of referent object, the scope of issues covered (the degree of securitization), and indeed within specific issues.

New thinking on security has gradually come to the fore in the field, with input from academics and also from practitioners in international organizations and states. In the
early 1980s Japan adopted a “comprehensive security” policy under the direction of Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki. Comprehensive security not only looked beyond the traditional security elements of individual self-defence by focusing on regional and global security arrangements, but also stressed the need to take into account other aspects vital to national stability, such as food, energy, environment, communication, and social security, as well as emphasizing collective security institutions. Non-traditional security agendas are now in vogue in other parts of the world and are often termed “new security challenges”. The characteristics of such challenges include some or all of the following: a focus on non-military rather than military threats; transnational rather than national threats; and multilateral or collective rather than self-help security solutions.

Japan has also been instrumental in pushing forward the next step in the evolution of security conceptualization, providing many of the policy initiatives and much of the impetus for the development of the human security discourse, and acting as the largest contributor to the human security related practices and intuitions of the UN. An emerging multidisciplinary paradigm for understanding global vulnerabilities at the level of individual human beings, human security incorporates methodologies and analysis from a number of research fields, including strategic and security studies, development studies, human rights, international relations, and the study of international organizations. It exists at the point where these disciplines converge on the concept of protection of the individual.

UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali’s made the first explicit reference to human security from the organization’s perspective in his 1992 *Agenda for Peace*. In this report, the concept was used in relation to preventative diplomacy, peace-making, peacekeeping and post-conflict recovery. The report drew attention to the broad scope of challenges in post-conflict settings and highlighted the need to address root causes of conflict through a common international moral perception and a wide network of actors under “an integrated approach to human security”, but essentially took a narrow approach to the definition, focusing on physical threats to the lives and wellbeing. In 1994, the UNDP Human Development Report stressed the need for a broader interpretation of human security, defining it as “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” and further characterized human security as “safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and repression as well as protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities”. At the UN Millennium Summit in 2000 then General Secretary Kofi Anan took up the call of freedom from fear, and freedom from want, and placed these concepts centre stage for the global governance mission.

Yet the two concepts are at the basis of a schism within the academic and practitioner community when it comes to the analysis of threats to human security and
policy prescription. Proponents of a “narrow” concept of human security (a freedom from fear emphasis which underpins both the UN Responsibility to Protect approach and the Human Security Report Project’s Human Security Report) focus on violent threats to individuals, while recognizing that these threats are strongly associated with poverty, lack of state capacity and various forms of socio-economic and political inequity. Proponents of the “broad” freedom from want concept of human security such as that articulated in the UN Development Programme’s 1994, Human Development Report, and the Commission on Human Security’s 2003 report, Human Security Now, argue that the threat agenda should be broadened to include hunger, disease and natural disasters because these kill far more people than war, genocide and terrorism combined. All proponents of human security agree, however, that its primary goal is the protection of individuals, and on a distinction between human security and national security. While national security focuses on the defence of the state from external attack, human security is about protecting individuals and communities from any form of threat to their wellbeing or even their very existence.

Where this paper differs from the majority of discourse on the subject, is by insisting on a continuum approach to international security wherein “new” human-centred approaches are intimately related to “old” state-centric considerations. It is no longer a question of only focusing on threats between states, but it remains a utopian dream to think that we can now focus exclusively on threats within states. Although distinct in terms of focus and (when looking at elements of human security) referent objects, there remains a close relationship between traditional and non-traditional security approaches. On the one hand, national insecurity may lead to human insecurity along various paths. It can divert resources from human development. It can drain energy. It can create a permissive political circumstance where national security is privileged over human rights. Furthermore, it is likely to produce and perpetuate an operating environment within which the exceptional use of internal as well as external violence by the state becomes a permanent feature of the state. Fear on a national level percolates down to fear on an individual level.

On the other hand, human insecurity in turn can threaten national security in a number of ways. Fear on an individual level, for example caused by violence from other individuals or even the state, can lead a group of victims to take refuge in a neighbouring country, impacting upon its human security condition. Worse, those refugees may regroup, recruit, and rejuvenate to strengthen their capacity to undermine the security of those who forced them to flee in the first place. Also, want on an individual level, such as lack of food or energy -- especially if it is spread unevenly across the nation -- can undermine national cohesion and weaken national strength, increasing national insecurity. Fear on an individual level percolates up to fear on a national level. Desperate conditions among the disaffected
youth of refugee camps or inner cities have the potential to produce fertile breeding grounds for religious extremism or terrorism. Thus, human insecurity becomes a source of insecurity for states.

Mass cross-border migration patterns, whether in terms of refugees or economic migrants, and whether legal or illegal can contribute to an increase in interethnic tensions in the new host country, and also, potentially an increase in crime, whether petty or organized transnational. Security concerns related to Asian trans-border migration and refugee flows feature prominently on the traditional security radars of China (Vietnamese, North Koreans, and Burmese nationals), Thailand (Burmese and Lao nationals -- particularly ethnic Hmong), Malaysia (Indonesians and Philippine nationals), and Australia (Chinese and Pacific Island nationals). In 2007, Australian Federal Police Commissioner Mick Keelty identified climate change and food insecurity in the Asia-Pacific region as the greatest security threats faced by Australia as they would force an exodus of refugees to seek illegal residence in Australia, further exacerbating social unrest.16

A non-traditional security issue therefore has the potential to become a traditional security threat, and issues of human security can morph into ones of pressing concern for the survival of states themselves or the peace and security of a region or even the globe. Thus, it is in the enlightened self-interest of states and statesmen as well as the international community, however broadly defined, to pay attention to non-traditional and human security concerns. Once the vicious cycle between national and human insecurity is recognized, therefore, it becomes at least plausible that one way to address human insecurity is to help the target state ameliorate its national security concerns, and vice versa, with the amelioration of human security concerns helping a target state feel less vulnerable. To seek freedom from fear is to provide for national security. Freedom from fear is integral to national security and vice versa, although one does not necessarily guarantee the other. Table 1 places the human security approaches in the wider theoretical and practical discourse on security studies.
### Table 1. Approaches to International Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Security</th>
<th>Main Actors</th>
<th>Threats From</th>
<th>Main Targets</th>
<th>Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>States</td>
<td>States</td>
<td>States</td>
<td>Defence, Deterrence, Balance of Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Security/ Narrow Definition</td>
<td>IGOs, States, NGOs</td>
<td>States and Non-State Actors</td>
<td>Individuals and Communities</td>
<td>Genocide, Humanitarian Intervention, Explosive Remnants of War (ERW), Peacekeeping, Responsibility to Protect</td>
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All of these approaches are interrelated and non-exclusionary. Thus, for instance, human security considerations in a “rogue regime” such as North Korea have the potential to spill over into national and international security challenges and vice versa. There is a close relationship between human security envisioned as the protection of persons, and human development as the provision of basic human needs. Human security and human development are both people-centred. They challenge the orthodox approach to security and development -- i.e., state security and liberal economic growth respectively. Both perspectives are multidimensional, and address people’s dignity as well as their material and physical concerns. Both impose duties on the wider global community.

Human security and development can be seen as mutually reinforcing. A peaceful environment frees individuals and governments to move from a focus on mere survival to a position where they can consider improvement of their situations. Likewise, as a society develops, it is able to afford more doctors, hospitals, welfare networks, internal security operations, schools, and de-mining operations. Conversely, as former UN Secretary-General Annan observed in his UN Report *In Larger Freedom*, “we will not enjoy security without development, development without security, and neither without respect for human rights. Unless all these causes are advanced, none will succeed”. Conflict retards development, and underdevelopment can lead to conflict.

In the past three decades, 21 of the 49 least developed countries (LDCs) have experienced grave episodes of violence and instability.\(^{17}\) Indeed, the prevalence of warfare around the globe has resulted in post-conflict development “becom[ing] the norm rather than the exception”.\(^{18}\) The negative reinforcement of insecurity and underdevelopment can continue long after the official cessation of hostilities. *Post-bellum* threats to both life
and wellbeing include the breakdown of law and order, the spread of disease as a result of refugee camp overcrowding, poor nutrition, infrastructure collapse, scarcity of medical supplies (although ironically often a proliferation of illicit drugs), and continued criminal attacks on civilian populations, unemployment, displacement, homelessness, disrupted economic activity, explosive remnants of war (ERW), and stagflation.

Thus at both the domestic policy level and at the level of international or global governance, it is important to adopt comprehensive or holistic courses of action that address simultaneously human insecurity and economic underdevelopment. “Governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs”. It is an on-going and evolutionary process that looks to reconcile conflicting interests through the rule of law in order to protect the weak from unjust exploitation and to introduce security for all. Governance is also a process through which collective good and goods are generated so that all are better off than they would be if acting individually. It implies a concern by those who govern with both the human security and development of those who are governed. Table 2 reflects the relationship between security and development under the rubric of governance.

Table 2. Theoretical and Practical Elements of Global Governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GLOBAL GOVERNANCE</th>
<th>RECONCILE CONFLICTING INTERESTS/PROTECT INTERESTS AGAINST OTHERS</th>
<th>GENERATE COLLECTIVE GOOD/FACILITATE COOPERATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional State-Centric Security</td>
<td>Non-traditional Security/New Challenges</td>
<td>Human Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence, Deterrence, Arms-Racing, Balance of Power, Security Dilemma, Conflict Management, Conflict Resolution</td>
<td>Natural Disasters, Disease, Global Warming, Pollution, Terrorism, Transnational Crime, Resources</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect, Freedom from Fear, Genocide, Humanitarian Intervention, Explosive Remnants of War (ERW), Peacekeeping</td>
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Responsibility to Provide
Policies which fail to address these requirements of global governance not only do a disservice to the most vulnerable sections of international society, but also can prove ineffective, or even counter-productive when dealing with some of the most pressing international security concerns.

CONCLUSION
The dominant neorealist and neoliberal state-centric discourses of traditional security analysis, and the strategic policy prescriptions based on their internal rational assumptions, can be seen as increasingly obsolete due to their normative and practical limitations. This article has demonstrated not only the growing relevance of non-traditional thinking on security, with input from both academics and also from practitioners in international organizations and states, but also the need to put internal, human considerations firmly at the centre of strategic planning. The changing nature of the international normative environment may well have imposed upon us an obligation to protect the lives of the most vulnerable, and even a duty to provide for their basic human needs, but the article also demonstrates how it is in the rational self-interest of statesmen to do so.

The new international security operating environment has generated significantly expanded policy prescription. In December 2001 the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) released its final report entitled The Responsibility to Protect. This declaration included a specific endorsement of humanitarian intervention and the use of force by expressing willingness “to take timely and decisive collective action for this purpose, through the Security Council, when peaceful means prove inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to do it”. Thus the declaration of a Responsibility to Protect (R2P) can be interpreted as a duty to use force to intervene humanitarianly. In the intervening years this new paradigm has gained momentum and garnered international recognition.

In response to this international normative shift, at the High-Level Plenary Meeting for the 2005 World Summit (14-16 September) the world’s leaders at the General Assembly agreed on a “responsibility to protect” which included a “clear and unambiguous acceptance by all governments of the collective international responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”. Resolution 1674, adopted by the United Nations Security Council on 28 April 2006, “Reaffirm[ed] the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”, and commits the Security Council to action to protect civilians in armed conflict. This resolution was adopted unanimously. On 14
September 2009, in the course of the closing plenary of its 63rd session, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution A/63/L80 Rev.1 entitled “The Responsibility to Protect” which had been co-sponsored by 67 member states from every region in the world. Only seven states sought to play down the importance of the document, stressing that in their opinion the resolution was strictly procedural, none of which was from the East Asian region.20

Non-violent challenges and the related inactions or incompetence of states may, however, actually pose a greater threat to human security, especially in terms of a freedom from want, than that of violent actions in terms of freedom from fear. A responsibility to provide safe havens can be viewed as deriving from the duty states owe to their citizens not only not to harm them, but also to provide for or promote their basic needs. When states are unable or unwilling to do so, or worse, are sources of such hardship, the responsibility may transfer to other members of the international community. Likewise, as outlined above, developmental challenges may spill over into security challenges at the level of human, state, region and the world. Thus in the striving for peace, security policy and decision-makers need to address the sub-state developmental conflict drivers as much as they concern themselves with the state-centric threats posed by rogue regimes. would erupt again despite a cessation of hostilities in these conflict areas.7 Simply put, Japan is not yet a “normal country” in peace-building due to its risk aversion. The only exceptions

NOTES

5 Theodore Abel, “The Element of Decision in the Pattern of War” American Sociological Review 6, no. 6 (December 1941): 859.
6 Morgenthau, Politics, 6.

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